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The Greek Interwar Refugee Crisis as a
cause of the Greek Civil War, 19221949
Michael B. O'Sullivan
In his explanation for the causes of the outbreak of
the Peloponnesian War, the first civil war between
Greeks, Thucydides drew a distinction between "immediate" and "real" causes. This causation model is also
useful in understanding the origins of another civil war
between Greeks. The "immediate" cause of the 19441949 Greek civil war was the power vacuum resulting
from the withdrawal of the German Army and the
subsequent scramble for control of the state by the
rival political factions ofthe Greek Right and Left. This
is only part of the story. Identifying the "real," underlying causes of the Greek civil war is a task that historians have failed to pinpoint. Traditional narratives have
seen the war as the first conflict of the Cold War and
consequently have focused primarily on foreign interventions and the events in Athens from December
1944, while neglecting the communal conflicts in the
provinces. Within these narratives, class and ethnic
divisions are regarded as "relatively unimportant. '"
I See David Close, ed., The Greek Civil War, 1943- 1950:
Studies ofpolarization. (London: Routledge, 1993).; David H.
Close, The Origins of the Greek Civil War. Origins of Modern
Wars Series, (New York: Longman Publishing, 1995).; Edgar
O'Ballance. The Greek Civil War 1944-1949. (New York:

Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966). In traditional accounts
of the Greek civil war, As Mark Mazower points Qut, "Athens,
London, and Washington [have] provided the focus, not villages,
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The Greek civil war was not, as has been previously
assumed, merely a bipolar struggle between two
political groups. Instead, it was a conflict between a
multitude of communities, down to tbe neighborhood
and village level, entangled in a web of antagonistic
ethnic and class cleavages. Witbin this imbroglio,
differences of etbnic and class identity among Greeks,
not competing political allegiances, were tbe most
crucial factors in provoking tbe outbreak of sustained
violence between communities during tbe Axis occupation. Communal warfare then facilitated tbe onset of a
general civil war. The atomization of Greece into a
series of divided communities, overwhelmed by outbreaks of open violence were in fact a manifestation of
two decades of persistent political, social, etbnic and
class divisions in Greece. The catalyst for these divisions was the refugee settlement crisis that followed
Greece's disastrous defeat in tbe Greco-Turkish war of
1919-1922. The repercussions of tbese crises are
responsible for what can be termed the "real" causes,
as Thucydides would have understood tbem, of the
Greek civil war.
valleys, or the provinces." The causes of the conflict have been
almost entirely attributed to a division between political groups
on the Right and Left. According to David Close, the
circumstances of primary importance were "competition for
control of the state by two sets of political leaders, each with
military allies, and each drawing support from a variety of
regions and from a wide range of occupational groups.n Ethnic
and class divisions remain largely unexplored as a catalyst for
the outbreak of the war. This is curious since many historians
acknowledge the ethnic problems associated with the refugee
settlement and the occupation but give them inadequate
attention within the explanation for the causes of the civil war.
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In 1919 the Greek army established a foothold in
far western Anatolia in the hopes of fulfilling the 'Great
Idea,' the driving force of Greek nationalism for the
past century, calling for the union of the Hellenic and
Anatolian Greek lands and peoples into a Greater
Greece? In July 1921, the Greek army struck eastward and northward with the goal of capturffig Angora,
the seat of the new Turkish government. 3 In full-scale
retreat after the Turkish counter-attack in August and
September, the Greek army made no distinction
between Turkish and Greek communities, burning
down villages and massacring the inhabitants. Left
homeless by the ftres set by the Greek army and
fearing Turkish retaliation, Greek refugees frantically
made their way to the ports of the Aegean, chiefly
Smyrna.'
Greek refugees were rounded up and forcibly
deported by the Turks from a number of regions
throughout Asia Minor, enduring constant attack on
their way to being deported from the port cities of
Greece. 5 These initial expulsions in the wake of the
Greek retreat were however only a fraction of the story.
In November 1922, Turkish and Greek representatives
met at Lausanne to discuss terms and to solve the
Greek refugee issue. By July 1923 the Treaty had been
signed, resulting in the mandatory transfer of 1.3
million Greeks who lived in Anatolia to Greece and
2 Norman Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in
Twentieth-Century Europe, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 20011, 44-5.
3 Ibid., 45.
4 Ibid., 46.
, Ibid., 53.
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356,000 Turks , the majority of whom lived in Aegean
Macedonia, to Turkey.
The difficulties associated with the settlement of
the refugees in the 1920s fueled a mutual animosity
between the refugee and native populations of the
country. These antagonisms were compounded primarily by four factors : the failure of the Refugee
Settlement Commission to successfully settle the
refugees, ethnic and cultural differences between the
two groups , conflicting political allegiances, and
economic competition. All of these factors reinforced
the refugees' sense of separation from their native
Greek neighbors.6
Settling 1.3 million refugees in an already overpopulated country of 5.4 million people was a monumental
task. In response, the Treaty of Lausanne mandated
the creation of Mixed Commissions run by the League
of Nations whose task was to oversee the settlement of
refugees in each country.7 In Greece the Refugee
Settlement Commission (RSC) was set up to assist the
Greek government in settling the refugees. Traditionally, the RSC has been seen as extremely successful,
helping to increase the economic productivity of the
country and acting as a stabilizing influence in the
6 Renee Hirschon, Heirs althe Greek catastmphe : the social
life of Asia Minor refugees in Piraeus. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 19891, 13
7 Renee Hirschon, ed. Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of
the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and
Turkey. Studies in Forced Migration, Vol. 12. (New York:
Berghahn Books, 20031, 7-8. The RSC was made up of four
members - two appointed by the Greek government, one by the

League of Nations, and the fourth, the chairman, an American
citizen named Charles B. Eddy. See also Hirschon, Heirs. 39 .
"J
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country at large by preventing tbe potential radicalization of the refugees."
Upon tbe dissolution of tbe RSC in 1930, its
chairman, Charles B. Eddy, published a book detailing
the work of the commission over the previous eight
years. Since most literature on tbe Greek civil war
devotes only a few comments to the refugee ~ettlement
and tbe RSC, historians have neglected to raise objection to Eddy's conclusions. The inability of historians
to adequately examine tbis report has profoundly
influenced tbe histories of interwar Greece. By neglecting to scrutinize the RSC reports, historians have
underestimated how the dramatic land reforms carried
out by tbe commission undermined social stability in
the villages of Greece by fostering tensions between
native Greeks and tbe refugees. Eddy's interpretation
of tbe RSC's successes is at best premature and at
worst a deliberate turning of a blind eye to the realities
of the refugee's plight. 9 Throughout, Eddy's tone is
, See Charles B. Eddy, Greece and the Greek Refugees,
(London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd 19311.; Georgios Kritikos,
"The Agricultural Settlement of Refugees: A Source of Productive
Work a nd Stability in Greece, 1923-1930", Agricultural History
79, no. 3., Agricultural History Society, (Summer, 20051: 32 1346.
, See Greek Refugee Settlement Commission. Settlement of
Greek refugees: General s ummary of the work of the Greek
Refugee Settlement Commission. Geneva: League of Nations,
1928; League of Nations. Assembly, Second Committee. Report
on the work of the Greek Refugees Settlement Co mmiss ion /
presen ted to the Assembly by the Second committee.
Rapporteur: M. van Cauwelaert (Belgiuml . Geneva: League of
Nations, 1926.; Greek Refugee Settlement Commission. Greece :
report on the liquidation a/the Refugee Settlement Commission.
Geneva: League of Nations, 1931.; Greece. Convention between
the Hellenic government and the Refugee Settlement Commission,
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self-congratulatory, lauding the success of the commission in assimilating the refugees into Greek society
and providing them with housing and opportunities for
economic advancement.
While the RSC did bring some solutions to a
seemingly impossible humanitarian crisis, the commission's policies governing the agricultural and urban
settlement of refugees in Greece created new crises
and incited intense animosity among native Greeks
toward both the refugees and the incumbent Greek
government.
The focus of the RSC was agricultural, with Macedonia as the main area of settlement, the rationale
being that the homes of forcibly deported Muslims
would be turned over to the refugees . 'o Large estates
were carved up among refugees, as were large swathes
of uncultivated land that had been formerly owned by
Turkish landownersY However, the redistribution of
Tur kish and Bulgarian lands posed an unexpected
problem. In the delay between the evacuation of the
Turkish landowners and the settlement of the refugees, local Greeks and non-Greeks had settled or
purchased the unclaimed land.
Preferring to deprive private owners of their land
rather than sacrifice state lands, officials of the RSC
expelled the native population from these areas in
order to free them up for use by the refugees. This
signed at Geneva on January 24th , 1930. Geneva; League of
Nations, 1930.; Greek Refugee Settlement Commission. Greece:
quarterly report of the Refugee Settlement Commission. Geneva:
League of Nations, 1924-30
10

Kritikos, 324.

II

Ibid. , 328.
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triggered a number of massacres in northern Greece. l2
These conflicts led to the division of villages into
distinct quarters based on ethnic identity, where the
natives remained in the old part of the village while the
refugees occupied enclaves away from the village
center. 13
Only in 1924 did the RSC begin to undertake the
settlement of the 500,000 refugees living ill urban
areas. For years after returning to Greece, refugees
lived in camps on the outskirts of Athens, Piraeus and
Salonika where disease was rife and food and medicine
extremely scarce. One report stated that forty to fifty
Greeks died every day in the camps throughout from
1922-1924, hundreds more dying in rudimentary
hospitals. 14 These circumstances were glossed over in
the often self-indulgent RSC reports.
In cities like Salonika, urban space was drastically
transformed in order to accommodate the refugees.
The settlement of the refugees in specific districts was
based on a logic of class stratification. 15 The removal of
the city's 25,000 Muslims dter 1923 cleared space for
the settlement of the more affluent refugees from
12 Ibid., 330. Both locals and refugees were massacred in the
district of Serres as the two s ides struggled to set the boundaries
of their lands. At Plevna, refugees and locals fought in the fields.
In Nigrita, locals burned down makeshift refugee huts and at
Koupji a number of killings occurred.
13 Elisabeth Kontogiorgi, Population Exchange in Greek
Macedonia: The Forced Settlement of Refugees 1922-1 930, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 259.
J<I Naimark, Fires of Hatred, 55.
15 Vilma Hastaoglou-Martinidis, "A Mediterranean City in
Transition: Thessaloniki Between the Two World Wars." Facta
Universitatis. Architecture and Civil Engineering 1, no. 4. (19971.
502.
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Anatolia in undamaged areas of the city. On the other
hand, poor refugees were settled in eighteen refugee
housing districts on the city's outskirts, consisting of
little more than shanty towns with squatter houses. 16
The organization of urban space based on affluence
greatly accelerated class divisions within cities like
Salonika. The stigma of ethnic difference endured by
the refugees was exacerbated by their spatial segregation on the city's outskirts. Class now came to compound already existing divisions based on ethnic and
political differences within the refugee community. As
upper class refugees became involved in politics they
began to distance themselves from the poor masses of
refugees. For the first time, "stratification and class
distinctions began to prevail over place of origin or
ethnic affiliation for a section of the Asia Minor population."·7 This would have significant repercussions
during the Second World War and the Greek civil war.
A common view, among both historians and observers living at the time, maintains that the ultimate
result of the popUlation exchanges after the GrecoTurkish war was to turn Greece into a more homogenous society.18 In fact, the Asia Minor refugees were
yet another stream of refugees inundating Greece from
1912 to 1922.19 Each group was extremely diverse in
terms of language, wealth, and customs. What proponents of the 'Great Idea' had failed to take into account
was that the Greek communities of Asia Minor, far
removed from the Greek mainland and having lived
Ibid.
Hirschon , Heirs ... ; 45.
18 Kontogiorgi, 19.
19 They were preceded by groups of Greek refugees from
Thrace, Bulgaria, the Black Sea littoral, and the Caucasus.
16

17
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under Ottoman rule for more than five centuries,
possessed a linguistic, cultural, and ideological heritage markedly different from the Greeks of the mainland.
As subjects in the Ottoman Empire, Anatolian
Greeks saw their connections with the Orthodox
Church in Constantinople as providing the basis for
their "enduring sense of separate identity." Despite
being a subject people, the religious identity of Anatolian Greeks during the centuries of Ottoman rule
produced no sense of inferiority, but rather one of
superiority to other groups under Ottoman rule!O The
Anatolian refugees kept this sense of cultural superiority and a separate identity when they came to Greece.
Their opinior,s oflocal Greeks were pejorative; perceiving "locals as narrow-minded, ignorant, and uncouth,
a view which became entrenched as time passed and
disillusionment grew."2l For their part, the locals
leveled insults at the refugees like "Turkish-seed,"
"yoghurt-baptized," and "orientals."22 Most Anatolian
Greeks did not consider themselves Greeks at all,
seeing themselves instead as "Anatolian Christians" or
"Christians from the East."23 Linguistic differences
made the divisions between refugees and natives even
more pronounced. Many refugees only spoke Turkish
and those few refugees who did speak Greek did so in
Ibid., 13.
Hirschon, Heirs, 12. Refugees also referred to local Greeks
as uncultured, rough, and boorish, commonly calling them
'Vlachs', shepherds or 'country bumpkins.' See Ibid., 33
22 See Mazower, Salonica, city of ghosts: Christians, Muslims
and Jews, 1430-1950. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 337;
Hirschon, Crossing. 19 .
23 Mazower, Salonica, 336-7.
20

21
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dialects incomprehensible to their native Greek neighbors?' One particular episode vividly illustrates this
point. As refugees from Anatolia flooded Salonika in
1923, the city's Muslim population, awaiting their own
deportation, were shocked to fmd that the refugees
spoke Turkish and sang in the same scale.25
Cultural differences then intensified political
dissension. Ethnic divisions between refugees and
natives occurred against a backdrop of political instability in Greece and the refugees worsened the political
divides initiated by the National Schism (Ethnikos
Dikhasmos) between monarchists and republicans.
The refugees pledged their support to the Republican
Party of Eleftherios Venizelos, the masterly politician
who, in direct opposition to the monarchy, brought
Greece into the First World War on the side of the
Allies and spearheaded the Asia Minor campaign.
Venizelos instituted massive land reforms throughout
the country, turning many Greeks, especially rural
refugees, into smalllandholders?6
With the support of the refugees and the new
territories recently incorporated into the Greek state
after the Balkan and First World Wars, the Venizelists
were able to dominate the polls throughout the
1920s. 27 To the refugees, Venizelos was 'Leader of the

24

Naimark, Fires of Hatred, 55.

Mazower, Saionica, 337.
26 Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler's Greece: the experience of
occupation, 1941-1944, (New
25

Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 12.
27 Thanos Veremis, "1922: Political Continuations of the
Exchange of Populations for Turkey," in Crossing the Aegean: An
Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between
Greece and Turkey, ed. Renee (sic) Hirschon, Studies in Forced
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Nation,' 'the One,' 'Our Father. >28 On the other hand,
the political opponents of Venizelos, the antiVenizelists, regarded him as "nothing less than the
embodiment of Satan himself."29 Stoutly monarchist
and anti-refugee, the anti-Venizelists drew their
support from the Peloponnese and Attica, the heart of
the nineteenth century Greek state, and areas where
few refugees settled. The regions where refugees were
settled were more divided between Venizelist and antiVenizelist supporters, the basis of support often being
ethnic identity. Although the refugees constituted
around one-quarter of the country's population, they
remained drastically under-represented in national
politics. 30 Despite their under-representation, the
refugees completely transformed the political landscape of Greece in the interwar period, principally
because they were responsible for defeating the old
political parties of Greece and infusing Greece with
new social perceptions. 31
The Venizelists began to lose popularity among
refugees after the Treaty of Ankara in 1930. Here
Venizelos and the Turkish representatives concluded
that the refugees from Anatolia would not receive
compensation for their properties left behind in Asia
Minor. 32 Venizelos soon thereafter fell out offavorwith
many refugees and they began to look for political
Migration, Vol. 12. (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 57.
28 Mazower, HitZer's Greece, 12 .
29 Ibid., 12.
30 Hirschon, Heirs, 44.
31Dmitri Pentzopolous, The Balkan exchange afminorities
and its impact on Greece, (London: Hurt and Company, 2002),
168; Veremis in Hirschon, Crossing. 55.
32 Hirschon, Heirs, 47 .
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patrons elsewhere, which allowed anti-Venizelist
factions to secure the significant refugee vote. Coaxing
the refugees in with the promise of compensation
denied to them by the Treaty of Ankara, the antiVenizelists immediately upon taking power reneged on
the promise and once again undertook an anti-refugee
program.
It was the combined effects of disillusionment with
the Venizelists, the economic depression of the 1930s,
and the persecution experienced under the antiVenizelists that led a small percentage of refugee
communities to abandon traditional political patrons
in favor of more radical ones. 33 The movement among
refugees away from traditional patrons dissolved the
threadbare unity of culturally diverse rural refugee
communities, stimulating the further atomization of
the country into rival sects. All of this had dramatic
repercussions during the Axis occupation in the
Second World War.
The refugees pledged support to Venizelists because they "appealed to the sense of alienation of the
new lands which were under-represented in the state
machine."34 Among urban refugees, neglected by the
RSC and living in overcrowded slums in Greece's major
cities, this sense of alienation prompted them to
support the burgeoning Greek Communist Party
(KKE) .35 Founded in 1918, the KKE was never a
popular party during the interwar period. The most
votes it obtained in any election was 10%.36

33
34
35
36

Hirschon, Heirs, 44.
Close, Origins, 13.
Hirschon, Heirs, 29 .
O'Mallagh, 30 .
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Unsurprisingly, Communism held little appeal among
rural refugee landowners, because the ownership of

land ensured a certain degree of fmancial security and
created a petit-bourgeois mentality among rural
refugees. 37 In addition, because the Greek state had
provided them with their landholdings, refugees saw
little reason to subvert.the state.
Chief among the reasons why Communism failed to
catch on with rural refugees was the KKE's 'Macedonia' agenda. Under orders from the Comintem in
Moscow, the KKE was obliged to campaign for an
independent Macedonian state. It was obviously
unpopular among refugees in northern Greece who
had recently been settled on landholdings in Macedonia. 3 • The refugees certainly did not wish to become
minorities once again, especially after they had gained
superiority in numbers in their new landholdings. The
KKE was also directly opposed, like the antiVenizelists, to the distribution ofland to the refugees
at the expense of the natives. 39
With the adoption of an anti-fascist Popular Front
policy in 1934, the KKE abandoned its 'Macedonia
program', for one that proclaimed "political equality for
all minorities."40 Now the Communists began to find
support among rural refugees, albeit a limited amount.
Also important to success of Communist propaganda,

31

Vilma Hastaoglou-Martinidis, "A Mediterranean City ......

503.
38 See Kritikos, "The Agricultural Settlement of Refugees .. .".
337-40.
39 Kontogiorgi, 188-9; George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn
Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922·
1936. (Berkeley: University of California Press, Ltd), 1983, 219.
~o Veremis, 58.
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was the abandonment of the rhetoric of rigid class
categories. This allowed the party to address the
refugees as a whole group, unified on the basis of
ethnicity and no longer separated by class
differences.4 1 Although rural refugees still remained a
small minority within the KKE, the developments in
1936 indicated the growing importance of ethnicity in
determining political affIliation. By 1935, half of the
Central Committee and most of the Politburo members
were refugees, including Party Secretary, Nikos
Zachariades!2
In the elections of 1936, the KKE gained 15 seats in
Parliament, which was enough to create a
parliamentary impasse,, 3 When the Liberals began
negotiating a secret deal with the KKE, the Army
withdrew its support for the government. Fearing a
coup, the recently restored King appointed General
John Metaxas premier and gave him the authority to
rule by decree .44 Soon thereafter, the KKE was
. suppressed, its leaders were arrested and its ranks
infIltra ted by the Metaxas security police . The Metaxas
government's identifica tion of the KKE as an internal
enemy coincided with the fostering of a national Greek
identity based on certain ethnic criteria, which helped
to reinforce the refugees' separateness,, 5 The
" KKE s tatement from 1936 titled "On the Refugee
Question." Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic, 222-3 .
42 Veremis, 58; Mavrogordatos. 222-4. Zachariades was born
in Asia Minor in 1903 and came to Greece in 1922 .
<13 Haris Vlavianos, Greece, 1941-49: from resis tance to civil
war: the strategy of the Greek Communist Party. (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 19921, II.
"" See Vlavianos, Greece, 1 941 -49, 13-4.
" Ibid .
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prevalence of urban refugees within the ranks of the
KKE led to the association of refugees, who were seen
as culturally and ethnically 'un-Greek', with
Communism, a foreign political ideology.4.
The Axis invasion and occupation of Greece
beginning in April 1941 removed the controls on civil
society enforced by the Metaxas regime. It also
transformed the KKE's role in Greek society. The KKE
took the lead in organizing systematic resistance,
forming the National Liberation Front (EAM) in
September 1941. Unable to persuade the bourgeois
parties to join EAM, the KKE was able to recruit
several left-wing political groups into EAM, which it
easily dominated. EAM \\ as principally a political
organization and the need for a more militaristic
resistance to the occupation led to the creation of the
National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) in April
1942.
ELAS was the only effective nation-wide resistance
group. The bourgeois parties failed in their attempt to
create a resistance movement since they lacked KKE's
ability to organize a mass mobilization and many
traditional politicians rejected the need to conduct a
resistance. The other principal resistance groups
operated in specific regions only and were primarily
military organizations, lacking the political program of
EAM/ELAS.47 Despite the fact that the KKE dominated
EAM/ELAS, the majority of its members were not
46 Hirschon demonstrates that the prevalence of Communist
sympathizers in refugee communities was later used to
stigmatize them. Even in the 19708 native Greeks continued to
stigmatize urban refugee localities because of this association.
See Hirschon, Heirs, 47 .
47 Vlavianos, 26-7 .
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Communist and by war's end the membership of
EAMjELAS included 30% of the Greek population. 4s
Yet, while the pre-war refugee urban districts were
bastions of support for EAMjELAS, among rural
refugees support for the organization varied
dramatically depending upon the region. The realities
of collaboration and resistance in cities and villages
throughout Greece during the Axis occupation starkly
reflected pre-war communal and ethnic cleavages.
Both the Greek resistance groups and the Axis
gendarmerie, with the support of Greek collaborators
like the Security Battalions, exploited pre-existing
disaffection between refugees, non-Greeks, and
Greeks.
Collaboration or resistance was contingent upon a
mUltiplicity of factors and motives, all of which varied
depending upon the region. For instance, the Turkishspeaking Pontians who accepted arms from the
Germans did so in order to "promote their interests as
. a community linguistically different from a neighboring
community. ,,49
In many cases collaboration or
resistance was based upon whoever was the more
dominant element in the town.50 A report written by
ELAS in 1944 "explained the arming of the refugee or
mixed villages of the eastern lowlands in terms of preexisting communal disaffection and friction."5l
Mixed villages throughout northern Greece and
Macedonia were divided between collaborators and
resisters based upon ethnic differences. In the case of

48
49
50

S!

Ibid., 251, 24.
Kolipulous. 77.
Ibid.
KolipuIous, 77
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the Macedonian town of Pel argos, the Greek-speaking
refugee population sided with ELAS while the Turkishspeaking refugees from the Pontus and the Caucasus
sided with the Germans. In other mixed villages, Slav
Macedonians sided with guerilla forces while the
refugees sided with the occupying forces. 52 In rural
Euboea, a region made up of Greek natives, Albanianspeaking Greek Orthodox natives, and Asia Minor
refugees, it was only the refugees who supported
EAMjELAS.53 Regions where the KKEhad been unable
to gain much support before the war were now strong
supporters of EAMjELAS. In parts of Western
Macedonia, Turkish-speaking refugees from Asia ·
Minor accepted arms from the Germans in order to
protect against ELAS attacks.54 However, in that same
region, EAM jELAS could rely on the support of Greekspeaking refugees from the Caucasus who were proRussian and supported Communism. To add to the
confusion, other communities of Greek-speaking
villagers in western Macedonia fled from EAMjELAS
abuses. 55 In Thrace, the impact of EAMjELAS was
virtually non-existent because of the presence of a
large Muslim minority and Bulgarian garrisons allied
with the Germans. In Thessaly, supportfor EAMjELAS
existed only among the radical refugees living in the
plains."6
Typically, EAMjELAS found support in those
regions, which were traditionally Venizelist. On the
other hand, many collabor?tionist forces like the
" Kolipulous, 73.
" Close, Origins, 98.
S< Ibid., 114.
55 Ibid., 90.
" Ibid., 97.
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Security Battalions were from the central provinces
and the Peloponnese, regions where support for
EAMjELAS was minimal!7 The lack of support in
these regions can be explained by the fact that very few
refugees had settled there in the 1920s and they were
traditionally anti-Venizelist,58 which left no room for
the development of political and ethnic cleavages
characteristic of regions where refugees were settled in
large numbers.
These inter-communal conflicts were not merely a
rural phenomenon. However, the source of conflict was
different in the urban areas. Whereas in the rural
areas ethnicity determined allegiance, class divisions
fueled conflict in urban centers. Fighting in the urban
centers had none of the confusion characteristic of
rural regions. Essentially it was a bipolar conflict
between the proletarian-backed EAMjELAS and the
bourgeois-supported collaborationist forces .
The refugees who had lived in the shantytowns of
. Greece's major cities had been radicalized by the KKE's
propaganda well before the war and their stratification
within the urban space made them intensely aware of
the significant socio-economic disparities between
themselves and the wealthier sections of the city.
Before the war the refugees had remained politically
marginalized, excluded by the bourgeois parties and
the elite from participating in the country's political
process. EAMjELAS provided the refugees with
opportunities of mass activism. 59
57 See Ibid., 97-9, II4-S.
" Ibid ., 90.
59 Mazower, Inside Hitler's Greece, 285.
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Many native Greeks in the urban areas were
vehemently opposed to EAM / ELAS and collaborated in
significant numbers with the Axis. Beginning in 1944
in the major cities of the country - Athens, Piraeus
and Salonika - heavy street-fighting broke out between
EAM/ELAS and a number of collaborationist groups.
In anti-partisan sweeps in the major cities, the
Security Battalions and the Germans attacked the
working-class refugee quarters, like Kokkinia in
Athens, which were strongholds of EAM/ELAS.60 On
the other hand, the urban middle and upper classes
were ardent supporters of collaborationist groups like
the Security Battalions. 61
Inter-communal conflicts reached their zenith in
1943-4, as EAM/ELAS grew more popular, which
made other Greek resistance groups, as well as the
exiled King in Cairo and the bourgeois-backed
collaborationist battalions, increasingly apprehensive
about a Communist takeover. In 1943, the other Greek
resistance groups like EDES signed a ceasefrre with
the Germans in order to fight EAM/ELAS. As the
Germans conducted large anti-partisan sweer,s
throughout the country with the support of
collaborationist groups, the profusion of intercommunal conflicts became more magnified.
They did not end with the Germa:.l evacuation in
October 1944. The well-known battles that took place
in Athens between EAM/ELAS and the British-backed
monarchist forces in December 1944, which have
Ibid., 341-2 .
As a Security Battalion marched through wealthy
neighborhoods in Athens before an attack on a section of the
refugee quarter held by EAM/ELAS the wealthy citizens
applauded in support. Ibid., 278.0
60
61
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always been the centerpiece of traditional histories of
the Greek civil war, were just one aspect of a much
larger pan-Greek conflict. Since the fighting in Athens
was a relatively straightforward conflict between two
groups, bereft of the chaos that distinguished rural
conflicts, historians have consequently characterized
the Greek civil war as a conflict between two political
factions . This interpretation is misguided. ELAS
activity in Athens in December 1944 was not part of a
coordinated effort to gain control of the country. In
fact, the majority of ELAS operations took place far
from Athens in the provinces, where its armed bands
worked towards suppressing communal conflicts,
disarming villages and defeating rival groups.
The nature of fighting in December 1944-January
1945, the first phase of the Greek civil war, was born
out of the conditions of collaboration and resistance to
the occupation and bore little resemblance to the later
years of the civil war. The Greek civil war only took on
a perceivably political character in the second phase of
the war, when after twenty-one months of ceasefrre,
EAM/ELAS re-opened hostilities in September 1946
when a plebiscite brought the King back into power.
Three years later, EAM/ELAS was fmally suppressed,
but in the interim the conflict had created a new wave
cf refugees as 500,000 people were driven from their
homes. The creation of even more refugees was a
tragic, yet fitting complement to the original refugee
crisis that helped to explain why Greece had
disintegrated into civil war.
In drawing a distinction between "immediate" and
"real" causes, Thucydides understood that the reasons
for wars were multidimensional. He recognized that a
multiplicity of factors, occurring over the short-term
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and long-term, were at play when communities entered
a struggle. Thucydides' appreciation of complex
causality helps the modern historian to identify the
underlying reasons for the outbreak of Greek civil war.
The occupation and the civil war were measures of the
extent to which the settlement of the refugees after the
Greco-Turkish War had fostered mutual ethnic and
class animosity between refugees and native Greeks.
These mutual hatreds manifested most strongly in the
conflicts between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, the
inability of the refugees to assimilate as a result of
cultural differences, and the physical segregation of
the refugees in the cities and villages, all of which
strengthened the refugees' sense of a separate identity.
Yet the marginalization of the refugees and their
abandonment of traditional political patrons after 1930
provoked a greater degree of splintering within
communities. During the occupation, pre-war
fragmentation produced a profusion of competing
ethnic factions vying for local supremacy, even within
minor villages.
With the outbreak of war, the artificial physical
boundaries that had been constructed before the war
broke down, as Greeks, both refugee and native, were
drawn by the tumultuous experiences of occupation
into the vortex of collaboration and resistance. The
occupation led to the reassertion of separate,
conflicting identities on the part of both refugees and
natives on the basis of ethnicity and class. These
identities were more virulent in their character
because divisions between groups were exploited by
the policies of the Greek resistance groups and the
occupiers. In each community the reaction to
collaboration and resistance varied, but the basis for
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finding identifiable patterns among groups in the
midst of the chaos of war rests on an understanding of
the pre-war divisions between refugees and native
Greeks. It can be concluded then that the traditional
Cold War vision of the Greek Civil War as a conflict of
two political camps misreads the situation poorly. This
paper reoriented the focus of traditional approach to
the Greek Civil War by turning attention away from
"Athens, London, and Washington" and towards
"villages, valleys, [and] the provinces." Only with this
perspective can historians construct a narrative of the
war that fmally puts flight to the outdated Cold War
interpretations.

Michael O'Sullivan is a History major with a
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